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PRICE v. INS: REQUIRING RESIDENT 
ALIEN SEEKING CITIZENSHIP TO 
LIST ALL MEMBERSHIPS AND 
AFFILIATIONS DOES NOT 
VIOLATE FIRST AMENDMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization 
Service,! the Ninth Circuit held that the United States Attorney 
General did not exceed his statutory authority by requiring a 
resident alien petitioning for naturalization to state past and 
present memberships in any and all organizations.2 The court 
concluded that the exercise of this authority did not violate peti-
tioner's First Amendment right of association because a resi-
dent alien's constitutional protection may be limited3 and 
invoke only narrow judicial review.4 
II. FACTS 
John Eric Price is a resident alien who petitioned for nat-
uralization in 1984.6 Question 18 on the application to petition 
1. 941 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (per Beezer, J.; the other panel members were 
Singleton, J., United States District Judge for the District of Alaska sitting by des-
ignation, and Noonan, J., dissenting). 
2. [d. at 882. 
3. [d. 
4. [d. at 884. 
5. Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 941 F.2d 878, 
879 (9th Cir. 1991). Appellant John Eric Price is a United Kingdom national who has 
lived and worked in this country since he was granted lawful resident alien status in 
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asked Mr. Price to list his memberships in any and all orga-
nizations.6 Mr. Price completed the entire application with 
the exception of Question 18, which he responded to with a legal 
brief contending that the question violated his First 
Amendment right to freedom of association.7 
When read the text of Question 18 at the Further 
Preliminary Hearing, Price told the examiner that he had no 
foreign military experience, that he had been a member of an 
organization, and that he refused to answer further questions 
regarding his association with any group on the grounds that 
the questions were both "overbroad" and violative of his First 
Amendment rights.s At this hearing and at an earlier hearing, 
as well as on the application to petition for naturalization, Price 
swore under oath that he had never been a communist, nor had 
he ever in any manner advocated, taught, or supported com-
munism.9 Price also swore that he had never been a member or 
affiliate of any organization in which membership or par-
ticipation would automatically preclude an alien from 
naturalization.10 
6. Question 18 reads: "List your present and past memberships in or affiliation 
with every organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club, society or similar 
group in the United States or in any other country or place, and your foreign military 
service. (If none, write 'None.')." Price at 879. 
7.Id. 
8. Id. Price refused to answer the following questions: "Are you now or have 
you ever been a member, or are you now affiliated, or have your ever been affiliat-
ed with any organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club, society or sim-
ilar group in the United States or in any other country or place?"; "Are you now, or 
have you ever been, in the United States, a member of any organization in the 
United States?"; "Have you been a member of any organizations outside the United 
States?"; "Have you ever been a member of a political organization in the United 
States?"; "Were you ever a member, outside of the United States, of any organization 
that ... is or was political?; Are you now or have you ever been a member of any asso-
ciation, fund, foundation, party, club, society or any similar groups?"; and "Have you 
ever been affiliated with any organization, political or nonpolitical, in the United 
States?". Id. at 879, n.lo 
9. Price at 879. On the application to petition Price denied ever being a mem-
ber of the Communist Party, or endorsing the interests of communism. Id. During 
a preliminary examination before an immigration officer Price avowed that he had 
never been a member of any organization proscribed by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, nor had he engaged in any acts therein prohibited. Id. At a 
Further Preliminary Examination, Price again swore under oath that he had never 
been a member of the Communist Party or an advocate or supporter of its aims and 
goals. Id. at 879-80. 
10. Price at 880. Mr. Price was given 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a) (1988) which explains 
that no person shall be naturalized who is a member of, or is in some way affiliated 
with, any organization which advocates or publishes material advocating anarchism, 
communism, totalitarianism, or the violent overthrow of the United States government. 
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Based on Price's refusal to answer Question 18, the district 
court denied the petition for naturalization on the recom-
mendation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(lNS).l1 Price appealed on the grounds that the Attorney 
General does not have the statutory authority to ask Question 
18, and that Question 18 violates the petitioner's First 
Amendment right to freedom of association.12 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY 
The Ninth Circuit first considered whether Question 18 
exceeded the authority granted to the Attorney General by 
Congress to implement the naturalization statutes.13 The court 
then considered whether exercise of that authority unconsti-
tutionally violated petitioner's right to freedom of association. 14 
1. Statutory authority to demand membership list 
The court found that Congress authorized the Attorney 
General to establish the breadth and depth of the examination 
into a petitioner's eligibility for citizenship.16 The scope and 
intensity of the investigation, however, must be limited to the 
applicant's "residence, physical presence in the United States, 
good moral character ... and other qualifications to become a nat-
uralized citizen as required by law. "16 Within these set limits, the 
court determined that the Attorney General is granted broad 
power to make inquiries provided the inquiries are relevant to 
the naturalization requirements established by Congress. 17 
Having established that the Attorney General has broad 
statutory authority to make inquiries of prospective citizens, 
11. Price at 880. 
12. [d. 
13. Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 941 F.2d 878, 
881 (9th Cir. 1991). 
14. [d. at 882-85. 
15. [d. at 881. The court cited 8 U.S.C. § 1443(a), which both grants this 
authority and establishes its limits. 
16. Price, 941 F.2d at 881. 
17. Price, 941 F.2d at 881. The court cites 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) which grants the 
Attorney General authority to require a naturalization applicant to attest to "all facts 
which in the opinion of the Attorney General may be material to the applicant's nat-
uralization." Price, 941 F.2d at 881. 
3
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the Ninth Circuit gave three reasons why the Attorney General 
did not exceed this broad authority when demanding a list of 
organizations of which Price was a member or affiliate. IS 
First, although Price contended that the § 1424(a) list 
given to him at the Further Preliminary Hearing was intend-
ed to be an exhaustive list of the proscribed organizations,19 the 
court found no legislative history to support petitioner's posi-
tion.20 The court agreed with the INS that only by examining 
all organizations in which a petitioner was ever a member 
could the Attorney General determine whether a petitioner had 
been a member of a proscribed organization.21 
Second, the court stated that the INS is entitled to know of 
any facts bearing on the petitioner's eligibility for citizen-
ship.22 The court considered it "completely reasonable to assume 
knowing the organizations with which a petitioner is associated 
will be relevant to one or more of the requirements of 
citizenship. "23 
Third, the court noted that INS decisions frequently impli-
cate questions of foreign relations.24 Therefore, the judicial 
deference to agency decisions in administrative contexts applies 
with particular force to the INS.26 
18. Price, 941 F.2d at 881·82. 
19. 1d. at 881. See supra note 10. The list includes organizations such as the 
Communist Party of the United States and the Communist Political Association. 
1d. at 880. 
20. Price, 941 F.2d at 881. 
21. 1d. at 881. The INS' position was that if a petitioner was unaware that an 
organization was a communist front, or wrongly believed that an organization was not 
the type prohibited under § 1424(a), petitioner would not list that organization in 
response to an eligibility inquiry. 1d. This, in turn, would leave the INS dependent 
on a petitioner's own determinations whether an organization was of the prohibited 
type.1d. 
22. 1d. at 882. See also Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U.S. 630 (1967). 
The petitioner in this case was denied naturalization on the grounds that he was not 
a person of "good moral character- because he testified falsely in the preliminary nat-
uralization proceedings when questioned regarding membership in the Hungarian 
Communist Party. 1d. at 637. Further, "the Government is entitled to know of any facts 
that may bear on an applicant's statutory eligibility for citizenship." 1d. at 638. 
23. Price, 941 F.2d at 882. 
24.1d. 
25. 1d. See also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988). The Supreme Court affirmed 
the Board ofImmigration Appeal's denial of a motion to reopen deportation hearings, 
partially on grounds of deference to INS officials' sensitive political functions. Abudu 
at 110. 
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2. Resident alien's constitutional right of association 
The court began its analysis by noting that aliens seeking 
admission to the United States for the first time have no con-
stitutional rights.26 The court then observed that once an alien 
enters the country and develops ties and connections, his con-
stitutional protections change.27 However, the court went on to 
state that the constitutional protection afforded resident aliens 
may be limited.26 The court finished its initial observations by 
declaring that "the Court has historically afforded Congress 
great deference in the area of immigration and naturalization. "29 
The Ninth Circuit refused to apply strict scrutiny to the 
Attorney General's exercise of his authority to require peti-
tioner to list all memberships.so Although the petitioner's right 
of freedom of association was implicated, this did not demand 
extension of the court's scrutiny.31 Applying the Kleindienst v. 
Mandel32 standard, the court decided limited judicial scrutiny 
26. Price, 941 F.2d at 882; The court relied on Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 
(1982) wherein the Supreme Court held that "an alien seeking initial admission to the 
United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his appli-
cation." Landon at 32. 
27. Price, 941 F.2d at 882. See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (res-
ident aliens have First Amendment rights). 
28. Price, 941 F.2d at 882. The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court 
decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), which held that 
constitutional protections are not available for a nonresident alien. The Court stat-
ed that previous decisions granting constitutional rights and privileges to resident 
aliens were "constitutional decisions of this Court expressly according differing pro-
tection to aliens than to citizens, based on our conclusion that the particular provi-
sions in question were not intended to extend to aliens in the same degree as to 
citizens." ld. at 273. 
29. Price, 941 F.2d at 882. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (not for 
court to test legislative decision in special preference immigration statute). See also 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). "In the exercise of its broad power over natu-
ralization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unac-
ceptable ifapplied to citizens." Mathews at 79-80. 
. 30. Price, 941 F.2d at 883. 
31. ld. The court relied on Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) for the 
appropriate standard of review in cases involving immigration and First Amendment 
matters. In Kleindienst, Ernest Mandel, a radical Marxist scholar, was denied a tem-
porary visit visa to the United States. ld. at 759. Several United States citizens 
brought suit claiming Dr. Mandel's exclusion violated their First Amendment right 
to freedom to receive information and ideas. ld. at 759-60. The Supreme Court rea-
soned that since immigration is a Congressional policy-making area and its execution 
is an executive function, the court is granted only narrow judicial review. ld. at 769-
70. The Court established a standard that forbids the court to look behind the exer-
cise of an executive's decision on a facially legitimate and bona fide reason to exclude 
an individual from entering the country, nor test the decision by balancing its justi-
fication against First Amendment interests. ld. 
32. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
5
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was appropriate and declined to balance the justification of the 
executive's power against the petitioner's First Amendment 
right because the power was exercised for a facially legiti-
mate and bona fide reason.sa 
The Ninth Circuit stated that this limited standard of 
review was also appropriate because no alien has any right to 
naturalization unless all statutory requirements are met.34 
Furthermore, the burden of proving compliance with all statu-
tory requirements for naturalization rests with the resident 
alien seeking citizenship.36 
The Attorney General's decision that knowing the political 
associations of a resident alien seeking citizenship is rele-
vant to eligibility is facially legitimate and bona fide. 36 
Therefore, under limited judicial scrutiny, the question requir-
ing a resident alien to list his memberships does not violate the 
First Amendment.37 Failure to respond, however, is sufficient 
grounds for denying the petition for naturalization.38 
B. DISSENT 
In his dissent, Judge Noonan claimed that the Attorney 
General's exercise of the power to require an answer to 
Question 18 was unconstitutional because it chilled Price's 
right to freedom of association. 39 The dissent felt that resident 
aliens receive full constitutional protection once they 
33. Price, 941 F.2d at 885. The court disagreed with Price's contention that 
Kleindienst did not apply because his case involved naturalization, rather than immi-
gration. Id. at 883. The court stated that "naturalization decisions ... deserve at least 
as much judicial deference as do decisions about initial admission.· Id. The court went 
on to say that although Price was entitled to expect the greatest degree of constitu-
tional protection that could be afforded to him, as a non-citizen that protection cer· 
tainly could not be considered greater than that afforded to the plaintiff/appellees in 
Kleindienst. Id. at 883·84. 
34. Id. at 884. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (held an alien 
who lied to procure admission and citizenship could be deported). 
35. Price, 941 F.2d at 884. See also Berenyi, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967). The 
Supreme Court held that the burden of proof is on the applicant for naturalization "to 
show his eligibility for citizenship in every respect.· Id. at 637. See also supra note 22. 
36. Price, 941 F.2d at 885. 
37. Id. at 884. 
38. Id. at 885. 
39. Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 941 F.2d 878, 
885·886 (9th Cir. 1991). Judge Noonan likened the Immigration Service's treat-
ment of resident aliens to pre·Abolition slaves in that resident aliens are "subject to 
treatment as second class people in the United States." Id. at 885. 
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lawfully enter and reside in the United States.40 The dissent 
concluded that because resident aliens are granted constitu-
tional protections, the Immigration Service can only exercise 
its broad statutory authority within its circumscribed consti-
tutionallimits.41 The dissent felt that the majority construed 
this authority in such a way that it is unconstitutiona1.42 
Permitting the use of this authority to formulate questions 
intended to gauge something as immeasurable as a petitioner's 
character is impossible. The dissent felt the statute was uncon-
stitutional because it both lacks rational purpose and infringes 
on the right of free association.43 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment 
rights of resident aliens petitioning for naturalization will 
not be balanced against the actions of an Attorney General 
exercising congressionally-granted statutory authority for 
'what the court considers a facially valid and bona fide reason.44 
The Ninth Circuit stated that if the Supreme Court would 
not balance the First Amendment interests of United States cit-
izens against an executive decision made with a facially legit-
imate and bona fide reason, the Ninth Circuit certainly cannot 
be expected to implement greater judicial scrutiny when an 
executive decision is made in regards to a resident alien.46 
This holding establishes that the First Amendment rights 
of resident aliens petitioning for naturalization invoke only nar-
row judicial review. The practical effect of this ruling is that the 
40. [d. The dissent quotes with approval Justice Murphy's concurrence in 
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1946) that ·once an alien lawfully enters and resides 
in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
to all people within our borders." Id. at 161. Justice Murphy's view was later adopt-
ed by the Supreme Court in Kwong Hai Chu v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (held that 
resident aliens enjoy constitutional protections). 
41. Price, 941 F.2d at 886. The dissent suggests a more tailored question, 
directed at petitioner's involvement in any organization dedicated to the overthrow 
of the government or membership in any foreign military or intelligence 
service would serve the intended purpose. [d. Use of this question would inform the 
naturalization examiner of relevant information without being overly broad and 
inquiring into associations with no relation to governmental concerns. [d. 
42. Price at 886. 
43. [d. 
44. Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 941 F.2d 878 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
45. [d. at 884. 
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Attorney General will be permitted to ask, and an applicant 
required to answer, any question which the Attorney General 
considers material to an applicant's eligibility for citizenship, 
provided the court can find a facially legitimate and bona fide 
reason for the question. Given the court's deference to Congress 
in the area of immigration and naturalization, the Attorney 
General could now conceivably ask almost any question of an 
applicant, under the guise of determining an applicant's "good 
moral character," without running afoul of the applicant's con-
stitutional protections. 
Stuyvesant Wainwright IV* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law. Class of 1993. 
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